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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the state of relations between the military and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). It argues that the military–NGO relationship requires 
improvement. The involvement of the military in post-conflict reconstruction efforts is 
required due to the tenuous security situation and an increased in military–NGO 
cooperation/coordination is necessary in order to achieve stabilization of the post-conflict 
society. This thesis supports the argument that an effective way of increasing 
cooperation/coordination is by improving the preparation of military officers who are 
expected to operate in that cooperative environment. 
This research will first consider the effectiveness of existing practices for 
preparing military officers for NGO interaction and will provide recommendations for 
improving this preparation through the utilization of an anonymous survey provided to a 
cross-organizational audience. The lessons learned as a result of this research, will 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis explores what can be done to prepare officers being assigned to post-
conflict reconstruction operations positions.  Officers who are assigned to positions 
involved in post-conflict reconstruction have the opportunity to read literature, as well as 
to participate in briefings, workshops, formal education, and cooperative exercises 
designed to provide a better understanding of the post-conflict environment in terms of 
the role of military–NGO cooperation and coordination. However, despite attempts to 
improve military–NGO cooperation, there is room for additional improvement in this 
area. This thesis will examine ways to improve cooperation by improving the preparation 
military officers receive prior to participating in post-conflict reconstruction operations. 
This thesis will address the question, “How can officers be better prepared to interact 
with non-governmental organizations in a post-conflict environment?” 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The United States military is currently involved in two major reconstruction 
efforts (Iraq and Afghanistan), in addition to numerous smaller efforts (East Timor, Haiti, 
etc.).  The requirement that the military operate effectively in a reconstruction 
environment is now more important than ever. This has been recognized by the 
Department of Defense (DoD), which set the directive that the department is to “be 
prepared to conduct stability operations with proficiency equivalent to combat 
operations.” This point was first made in DoD Directive 3000.05 in November 2005, and 
reaffirmed in DoD Instruction 3000.05 in September 2009.1 Reconstruction operations, if 
conducted properly, require the coordination of the military and NGOs. 
The recently published National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, 
and National Military Strategy all discuss the importance of organizations working 
                                                 
1 U.S. DoD Directive 3000.05 (Washington DC, November 28, 2005), 2. and U.S. DoD Instruction 
3000.05 (Washington, DC, September 16, 2009), 2. 
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together.  The National Security Strategy describes the “Whole of Government” approach 
as requiring the integration of the DoD with all other governmental entities in order to 
properly leverage resources and capabilities.2 The National Military Strategy provides a 
second approach, the “Whole of Nation” approach, which emphasizes that the military 
not only needs to be better integrated with other government entities, but also with non-
governmental entities. These non-governmental entities consist of industry, the media, 
and NGOs.3 This “Whole of Nation” approach emphasizes the importance of improving 
military–NGO relations.  
C. HYPOTHESIS  
This thesis tests three hypotheses. First, military involvement is required in the 
post-conflict environment due to the tenuous security situation, the fact that this situation 
is sometimes the result of military action, and the military involvement in the transition 
from conflict to post-conflict. Second, military–NGO cooperation is necessary to achieve 
a stabilized environment and that this is an area that requires attention and improvement. 
Third, military officers assigned to post-conflict reconstruction operations are not 
properly prepared for military–NGO cooperation and that by improving the military 
officers’ preparation, they will have a better understanding of the environment. This will 
in turn result in their being better able to interact with NGOs, leading to increased 
cooperation as NGO personnel begin to recognize the military officers’ more cooperative 
and understanding stance. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis built upon the following research efforts in order to provide 
recommendations for improving the state of military–NGO cooperation. 
The first element of this research is a literature review that provides a summary of 
the existing knowledge on the topic of military–NGO cooperation; the goals of this 
 
                                                 
2 Barack Obama, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC, 2010), 14. 
3 Michael Mullin, National Military Strategy (Washington, DC, 2011), 6. 
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literature review are to identify and explain the current state of cooperation, to highlight 
measures being taken in order to improve cooperation, and to consider existing criticism 
of these measures. 
The second element is the distribution and analysis of a survey targeted at people 
with relevant experience, in order to obtain their opinions and impressions of current 
practices as well as to solicit recommendations that could be used in the future. The 
survey was designed to validate the themes and conclusions discovered in the literature 
review, by presenting them to field personnel as a means of testing the previously-stated 
hypotheses. 
This thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter II includes a literature review of 
the existing publications that address the topic. Chapter III discusses the development and 
distribution of the survey. Chapter IV summarizes the findings of the survey and provides 
an interpretation of the results. Chapter V draws conclusions from both the literature and 
the survey and includes recommendations for practices with particular attention paid to 
effectiveness, cost, and return on investment. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter examines military and academic publications in order to present a 
background to the present situation, existing cooperation efforts, current mindsets, 
criticism for and against increasing coordination, and previous recommendations.  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The military and NGOs each have specific mindsets, capabilities, and convictions 
regarding assistance to conflict-affected communities; however, they are often forced to 
operate cooperatively in order to provide a comprehensive solution to reconstruction 
efforts in a post-conflict environment. Previous efforts at cooperation cover a large span 
of time and have had varying levels of success. Notable examples include the 
reconstruction efforts of the post-World War II Marshall Plan in Germany and the 
Vietnam War-era Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). 
Currently, the military is involved in reconstruction efforts in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, where it is facing complications in military–NGO cooperation. In order to 
understand these challenges, this section provides a brief history of NGO development.  
B. THE EVOLVING POLITICAL WORLD 
In summarizing international relations theory, it has traditionally been believed 
that the state is the fundamental unit of sovereignty and that it alone has a monopoly on 
force and coercion within its territory. The state was viewed as being responsible for the 
protection of its citizens and its self-preservation. This viewpoint is known as the Realist 
Theory in and is commonly used to explain decision-making in international relations. 
This theory posits that military force is the “leverage” that is applied to international 
relations and that political decisions are made in a constant state of possible war. This 
forces states to view the international system and their position or security in the context 
of relative advantages to the other state actors. This viewpoint in turn leads states to build 
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up military power in an effort to guarantee national survival. According to Realist Theory 
states will recognize other states’ military power and act correspondingly. 
While Realist Theory is commonly accepted, it is unable to explain global events 
and international relations in their entirety, which led to the development of other 
theories. Liberalism proposed that international relations decisions were based on 
international cooperation among non-state organizations, such as the United Nations 
(UN), and the world economy. While these are not considered established states, they are 
institutions that require attention when world leaders make decisions. Liberalism suggests 
that states view the world in terms of absolute gains and the potential for every state to 
develop through cooperation and mutual well-being. 
The Theory of Constructivism considers that ideas and norms are the deciding 
factors in international relations decisions. Regarding humanitarian aid, Constructivists 
would argue that countries participate in humanitarian actions because it is the right and 
moral thing to do.4   
C. THE APPEARANCE OF NGOs ON THE GLOBAL SCENE 
As the theories of Liberalism and Constructivism gained prominence, state and 
non-state actors came to recognize that the state is not the sole source of power and 
influence. This has resulted in an increase in NGO participation on the global scene. An 
NGO is defined as “an organization that is a legally constituted entity created by private 
organizations or people with no participation in or representation of any government.”5 
These organizations are often well-financed, properly staffed, and focused on 
remedying a specific problem that they believe requires attention. They look solutions 
that are not being provided by existing institutions. They are not tied to any government 
and receive the majority of their funding from private donations. While some NGOs 
                                                 
4Allison Stanger, One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of 
Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 39–42. 
5Grey Frandsen, Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military, ed. Lynn Lawry 
(Washington, DC: CDHAM and IHD, Summer 2009), 15. 
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receive government funds in support of their mission area, their funding typically comes 
with few or no strings attached, which allows NGOs to operate with few impediments. 
In the wake of globalization and the erosion of state powers, international 
organizations and influences (the United Nations, international corporations, the world 
economy, etc.) have become increasingly influential. This has allowed NGOs to become 
an outlet for private citizens, and coalitions of citizens, to further their dreams of 
impacting society in a positive manner. NGOs represent a means of providing a better 
situation for people or cultures that are in some way impoverished, displaced, or 
oppressed. NGOs typically operate in underdeveloped countries, trying to provide 
education, health care, or development in order to improve society and the global 
environment. They are best known for their assistance following natural disasters 
(earthquakes, typhoons, floods, etc.) and their ability to provide shelter, food, water, and 
stability to people in serious need. They are increasingly visible in conflict and post-
conflict environments, as they possess the desire and ability to provide the relief, in 
addition to supporting nation building.  
1. Examples of NGOs 
Three examples of NGOs are described in the following subsections as a way of 
providing some details for the generalizations made later in this chapter. The discussion 
of these NGOs includes the location of their headquarters, geographic operating 
environment, annual revenues, focus sectors, and a brief summary of their actions. These 
three NGOs were selected because they show a cross-section of the NGO community; in 
addition, two of them will be discussed later in this paper, regarding their position on 
military integration. 
a. OXFAM International and OXFAM America 
OXFAM is headquartered in Oxford, England. Founded in 1942, it 
participates in worldwide relief efforts. OXFAM operates with annual revenues of 
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approximately $2.6 billion and focuses on alleviating poverty, suffering, and injustice.6 
OXFAM America is an affiliate of OXFAM International; it is headquartered in Boston, 
Massachusetts, and operates in North America, Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and 
Asia. It has an operating budget of $68 million and focuses on issues relating to gender, 
microfinance, and human rights protection.  
Oxfam America is an international relief and development organization 
that creates lasting solutions to poverty, hunger, and injustice. Together 
with individuals and local groups more than 120 countries, Oxfam saves 
lives, helps people overcome poverty, and fights for social justice.7 
b. Doctors Without Borders 
Doctors Without Borders is headquartered out of Geneva, Switzerland, 
founded in 1971, and operates in more than 70 countries worldwide. It has an operating 
budget of $714 million and its goal is to provide assistance to “populations in distress, to 
victims of natural or manmade disasters and to victims of armed conflict, without 
discrimination and irrespective of race, religion, creed, or political affiliation.”8   
c. Project HOPE 
Project HOPE is headquartered out of Millwood, Virginia, and operates in 
Latin America, the Caribbean, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and the Pacific. It 
operates with annual revenues of approximately $200 thousand and focuses on health and 
education. 
Project HOPE is unique among international organizations in that we have 
always worked across the health spectrum in a wide variety of settings—
from the family and community levels to the tertiary care level—training 
traditional birth attendants and community health volunteers where 
resources are limited and cardiac surgeons and biomedical engineers 
where technology is appropriate. Though the challenges have evolved, 
 
                                                 
6Joseph Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (New 
York: Longman, 2009), 247. 
7Frandsen, Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military, 285. 
8Nye, Understanding International Conflicts, 246. 
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Project HOPE remains as committed as ever to addressing the world’s 
new health threats by playing a leadership role—forging new alliances 
among those on the frontlines of health and together seek new solutions.9  
Note: According to financial information found on the Project HOPE 
Website, the 2010 operating budget is $62 million, used as described in the Guide to 
Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military.10 
d. Summary of Examples 
There is a variety of NGOs that operate in every environment around the 
globe, each having different (although at times similar) objectives, methods, funds 
availability, and desires for coordination. As international relations have shifted away 
from the state-centric power model, individuals and non-state actors have become more 
powerful and capable than ever. NGOs have the capacity to accomplish things that state 
governments and militaries cannot. It is for this reason that NGO integration into the 
national security strategy must be considered. 
2. NGO Coordination Efforts 
It has been claimed that NGOs are unique because of their ability to operate 
without bureaucratic red tape, to focus on a single issue, to become subject matter 
experts, and to develop the local population’s trust. However, these characteristics may 
also lead to an inability to understand the “big picture” or to coordinate effectively in 
order to solve large, complex challenges. There are thousands of NGOs, each with its 
own vision, perspective, and priorities, a situation that creates challenges for inter–NGO 
coordination. 
Because each NGO has its own funding sources and focus area, getting NGOs to 
coordinate becomes increasingly difficult. There are corresponding increases in the 
intensity of the situation (number of refugees, casualties, intensity of violence, etc.), the 
                                                 
9Frandsen, Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military,  293. 
10http://www.projecthope.org/site/DocServer/Final_FS_FY10.pdf?docID=481, accessed on December 
10, 2010. 
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number of NGOs participating in the environment, and the range of outlooks among the 
organizations participating in the response. As these factors increase, which is very 
common in the post-conflict environment, it is reasonable to expect that the presence of 
various NGOs focusing on multiple small issues will result in overall reconstruction 
efforts suffering as NGOs become counterproductive due to a lack of organization. 
In response, some type of coordination is usually undertaking as a way of making 
sure that the organizations at least agree on basic priorities and procedures, in order to 
deliver services to those who require assistance. In the past, this coordination was 
accomplished at the lowest level via face-to-face meetings and coordination in the field. 
However, in the global environment where so many organizations are involved, it is not 
feasible to achieve successful coordination of a large-scale effort while using only small-
scale methods. 
a. Host Nation Systems 
While it is true that there has been a rise in the globalization of relief 
efforts, the host nation remains the ultimate authority on what assistance is provided and 
the manner in which it is delivered. Some nations create an office that assumes 
responsibility for long-term development coordination once the crisis has been handled 
and the government is in a position to direct aid efforts. An example of this is the 
Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission which was established within the 
Sudanese government and that is responsible for ”the repatriation, relief, resettlement, 
rehabilitation, [and] reintegration of returnees and internally displaced persons as well as 
the facilitation of the reconstruction of the conflict affected areas.” This commission 
coordinates any efforts, including those of NGOs, to provide assistance.11 
b. The United Nations – The Cluster System 
There are some situations in which the host nation is overwhelmed by 
conflict and the aid response.  This situation then renders the host nation incapable of 
                                                 
11http://www.gurtong.org/resourcecenter/gov/goss_commissions_institutions.asp#Revenue, accessed 
on December 10, 2010. 
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coordinating assistance efforts. In these predicaments, the host nation can request that the 
UN assume responsibility for coordination of the various entities, while still being 
included in decision-making and providing direction.  
In order to establish a system for coordinating aid efforts the UN 
developed a framework that could be applied to any crisis response. This system is 
known as the “cluster system” and while it has had its critics,12 its creation in 2005 
represented a revolutionary step towards the integration of humanitarian aid 
organizations. Prior to the shift to the cluster system, it was recognized that while the 
quality of aid delivered to local populations was being impacted by inefficiencies caused 
by a lack of coordination among inter-organizational efforts, there was no framework for 
coordinating aid. The cluster system was created in an effort to provide an organizational 
umbrella that could include all organizations in a functional structure, with a UN office 
acting as the lead agency.  It originally consisted of nine clusters; this number later grew 
to eleven. These clusters are Protection, Camp Coordination and Management, Water 
Sanitation and Hygiene, Health, Emergency Shelter, Nutrition, Emergency 
Telecommunications, Logistics, Early Recovery, Education, and Agriculture.13 
When a crisis is declared, the UN, utilizing the cluster system, attempts to 
integrate all applicable governmental and non-governmental agencies. The UN 
Interagency Standing Committee provides the basic framework and vision for the cluster 
system, but its greatest value is that it can be adapted to varied scenarios by operatives in 
the field.14 For example, while the framework includes a total of eleven clusters, in 
Afghanistan only eight of these have been implemented; Logistics, Early Recovery, and 
Camp Coordination and Management have not been established, as there are already-
existing offices that are capable of facilitating proper coordination (i.e., ISAF). 
                                                 
12Lydia Geirsdottir, HRO Afghanistan. NGO and Humanitarian Reform Project: Assessment of the 
Afghanistan Kabul-based Humanitarian Coordination Mechanisms June–September 2009, 
www.icva.ch/doc00004020.doc, accessed on August 18, 2011, 1–6. 
13http://unmit.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=760, accessed on December 10, 2010. 
14UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee Report on Operational Guidance on Designating 
Sector/Cluster Leads in Major New Emergencies, Geneva, May 23, 2007. 
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The cluster system is generally accepted as a good idea in principle, but 
there has been criticism of its the execution. Critics claims that the cluster system is 
incapable of gathering applicable data in order to measure needs and response 
effectiveness, lacks control of all organizations within a cluster, and lacks the ability to 
coordinate in an inter-cluster manner. 
While this framework has been established and sanctioned by the UN, 
there is no requirement for NGOs to operate within the cluster system. It is purely 
voluntary, which means that inefficiencies and counter-productiveness in the 
humanitarian aid delivery system remain and that these continue to cause inefficiencies.15 
c. NGO Self-Coordination 
There is disagreement within the NGO community regarding priorities and 
methods, but there is a growing recognition that only through cooperation is it possible to 
deliver aid efficiently. Some NGOs choose not to participate within the cluster system, 
and some crisis situations see no UN involvement. In response to this, some NGOs have 
been created to help facilitate inter-NGO cooperation. A prime example of this is the 
NGO called “InterAction.” InterAction was created with an acknowledgement that 
cooperation is the only truly effective way of providing aid. This is highlighted by the 
comments below, which are taken from InterAction’s website. 
InterAction is the largest alliance of U.S.-based international NGOs; these 
organizations are focused on the world’s poorest and most vulnerable people. Its vision 
statement reads: 
At InterAction, we recognize that our global challenges are interconnected 
and that we can’t tackle any of them without addressing all of them. That’s 
why we create a forum for leading NGOs, global thought leaders and 
policymakers to address our challenges collectively. Leveraging our 





                                                 
15Geirsdottir, 3–4. 
 13
organizations and strategic analyses of the foreign aid budget, we deliver a 
bold, new agenda to end global poverty and deliver humanitarian aid in 
every developing country.16 
d. Summary of NGO Coordination Efforts 
It should be recognized that NGO coordination is difficult and while there 
are existing networks, frameworks, and organizations that have been developed to ease 
the difficulty, there are still personality conflicts and differences in vision among the 
NGO community that may prevent complete cooperation. In addition to those basic 
reasons, the fact that, despite the existence of multiple coordination agencies, none of 
them can require NGOs to participate clouds the humanitarian aid situation even more. 
D. THE CHANGING NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 
ENVIRONMENT 
Well-respected NGOs have earned their reputations by being active in crisis and 
post-crisis environments. These crises can arise from conflicts such as interstate wars, 
intrastate wars, and genocides, or from natural disasters such as earthquakes, famines, 
and floods. Historically, NGO disaster recovery operations generally consisted of 
responding to a disaster to provide immediate assistance and then returning responsibility 
for reconstruction to host nations; however, this is not the current common operating 
scenario. Emergencies have become more complicated. For example, if the U.S. wishes 
to provide aid to flood-affected areas of Pakistan it must consider possible domestic 
political repercussions; NGO actions must take force protection issues into consideration 
when operating in the hostile environment in Afghanistan; and international community 
providing food, shelter, and violence concerns in East Timor must also include an aspect 
of nation-building. Long-term development must be considered in post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
 
                                                 
16http://www.interaction.org/about-interaction, accessed on December 10, 2010. 
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An increasing number of UN Missions are operating in a Chapter Seven mission 
capacity (Peace Enforcement), rather than in Chapter Six (Peacekeeping).17 As a result, 
more and more NGOs are operating in an environment where security has not been fully 
established, or where it has only recently been established and remains fragile. Now, 
more than ever, NGOs are required to operate within the same geographical area as the 
military. Some examples of military forces engaged in reconstruction efforts at the same 
time as NGOs are ISAF forces in Afghanistan, UN peacekeeping forces in East Timor, 
and the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. 
NGOs have always relied on their adherence to the principles of neutrality, 
impartiality, and humanity to create a “humanitarian space” within the conflict and post-
conflict environment. A humanitarian space is an environment where, because of their aid 
efforts being made available to all persons regardless of affiliation with the conflict, 
NGOs consider that they are accepted by all parties and are not in a threatening 
environment.18 
This situation is not as clear as it was in previous conflicts and the idea that 
aggressors respect humanitarian space is no longer clear. This shift has had multiple 
causes. First, there are documented cases where military personnel have been disguised 
as aid workers, as was the case in a 2008 Colombian military rescue operation.19 As a 
result, insurgents do not always consider aid workers to be impartial. Second, it has 
become an accepted tactic of radical insurgent groups to target aid workers in order to 
receive media interest and discourage the population from receiving aid. For example, in 
March 2010, six aid workers were killed and another seven wounded were in Pakistan, 
and four aid workers were also murdered Pakistan in February 2008.20 Human Rights 
Watch has petitioned foreign ministers from Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, 
                                                 
17http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/currentops.shtml, accessed on December 10, 2010. 
18Frandsen, Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military, 166–171. 
19Alexander Cuadros, “Colombia’s FARC Rebels Free First Hostage in a Year (Update 1),” 
Bloomberg Businessweek (Mar. 28, 2010) http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-03-28/colombia-s-
farc-rebels-free-first-hostage-in-a-year-update1-.html,  accessed on December 10, 2010. 
20Christianity Today. “Islamic Gunmen Kill Christian Aid Workers in Pakistan,” Compass Direct 
News Vol. 54, (Mar. 11, 2010) http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2010/marchweb-only/20-42.0.html 
accessed on December 10, 2010. 
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Mauritania, and Niger to provide protection to NGO personnel in response to the June 
2009 killing of an American aid worker in Mauritania, the November 2009 kidnapping of 
three Spanish aid workers in the same country, and the November 2009 kidnapping of a 
French aid worker in Niger.21 
As respect for humanitarian space has lessened, different NGOs have responded 
in a number of ways. Some organizations, such as Doctors Without Borders, remain 
adamant about not receiving any military assistance, or even giving the appearance of 
military assistance, as it still puts its faith in its neutrality, impartiality, and humanity. 
Other organizations, such as Project HOPE, have had a long-standing relationship with 
the military in order to take advantage of military assets; these assets can provide 
security, personnel transportation, logistic support, and even coordination with the host 
nations that allow military exercises where Project HOPE can provide health services to 
local nationals. An example of the impact that Project HOPE has was detailed in a June 
2010 USPACOM press release.22 The release discusses the Pacific Partnership Program, 
which consists of a contingent of U.S. Navy ships that visits developing nations in the 
Pacific with a variety of government agencies and NGOs, in order to provide assistance 
in the form of school construction, delivery of medical care, and other community 
development projects. The press release also details how the integration of a 25-person 
medical team from Project HOPE allows the NGO to accomplish much more through this 
program than it would otherwise be able to; working with the military reduces travel 
complications, improves host nation coordination, and provides logistics assistance. 
Finally, this article points out that by integrating with NGOs, the military mission is 
capable of providing aid, such as advanced healthcare—it would not be able to do this 
without the cooperation of NGOs. 
Most reporting on these exercises is found in public relations reports and 
generally provides highlights of accomplishments, including “feel-good” photographs. 
                                                 
21Corinne Dufka, “African Al Qaeda Should Stop Targeting Civilians,” Human Rights Watch (March 
16, 2010) http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/03/16/african-al-qaeda-should-stop-targeting-civilians, accessed 
on December 10, 2010.  
22http://www.cpf.navy.mil/media/news/articles/2010/june/jun9_PP10_PACOM_Commander_Visit.sht
ml, accessed on December 10, 2010. 
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While these reports provide initial feedback, later documents have shown that the long-
term effects of these exercises are not as positive as initially believed. For example, 
Medical Civil Action Programs (MEDCAP) and Dental Civil Action Programs 
(DENCAP) provide aid that is not available to the local population, which provided by a 
single delivery method might undermine the legitimacy of the local government.  
The principles and ethics of NGOs have long provided them with sanctuary from 
harm. However, as the global environment changes, this tenet must be re-evaluated and 
military integration must be considered. The following sections will explore this option in 
greater depth. 
E. MILITARY–NGO COOPERATION 
The largest challenge to military–NGO integration is accounting for their different 
perspectives. The military and NGOs have often disagreed on either the goal of 
involvement or, especially, the way to achieve success. There has always been some level 
of coordination between the military and NGOs, but in the past it has been possible to 
establish divisions either in geographic scope or labor. However, with the increased 
involvement of the military in intrastate wars and disaster relief, these divisions of 
geography and labor no longer exist. It has become more common that these 
organizations are forced to work together in the same operating area and come to an 
agreement on the tactics that are employed. 
1. Differences in Mindset 
There are many differences between the military mindset and the NGO mindset. 
These stereotypes were captured during a 2008 forum hosted by the Center for 
Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, Naval Postgraduate School (CSRS). NGOs 
were categorized as “Naïve Do-Gooders, Tree Huggers, Disorganized Cat Herders, and 
Anti-Military Peaceniks,” while the military was categorized as “Baby-Killing 
Warmongers, Short Timers who get in and get out, and Secretive.”23 While the exercise 
                                                 
23Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, Working in the 
Same Space Conference, September 21–24, 2008. 
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was intended to draw out polarizing comments, it also shows the underlying differences 
in opinions that exist. In short, NGOs understand that the military is trying to assist the 
best way they are able to, but feel that they “always have an out” in terms of perspective 
damage to the potential of long-term relationships and development in the host nations. 
The military’s view of NGOs includes an understanding that they are there to solve one 
problem at a time, while the host nation is faced with multiple issues. There is a belief 
that without a coordinated effort, solving a single aspect of a crisis is fruitless. The 
military also commonly interprets NGO actions as being slow and ineffective in the short 
term, which is when results are needed most (in the military’s opinion). 
2. Similarities in Mindset 
Despite all of these differences, it is beginning to be accepted that over time the 
military mindset has been shifting away from a “short-term shock and awe” approach 
toward a “long-term sustainable development” approach. The CORDS program, which 
was implemented but not completely leveraged during the Vietnam War, and an ongoing 
U.S. military and economic presence maintained in South Korea serve as examples of the 
military’s mindset opening to the concept of long-term involvement. However, it is the 
ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that demonstrate a complete acceptance of recent 
publications and instructions, which have been created with an eye toward shaping the 
efforts and funds spent, in order to result in a stable environment. 
As military involvement has shifted from nuclear war prevention and proxy wars 
during the Cold War, to lower intensity conflicts, the role of insurgents, revolutionaries, 
and terrorists has become more prominent. In response, the U.S. military has adopted a 
greater counter-insurgency approach that ever before.24 The fundamental theory is that by 
empowering the developing host nation and assisting in establishing stable governments, 
radical factions will not be given safe harbor. These developing nations will then be able 
to maintain their own national security, as well as to enhance the security of the United 
 
 
                                                 
24U.S. DoD, Quadrinnial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC, February 2010), 2. 
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States. This approach focuses on long-term, sustainable development where host nations 
develop the capacity to secure their borders and maintain peaceful stability within those 
borders.25 
The DoD recently released Instruction 3000.05, which states that the U.S. military 
“shall be prepared to conduct (stability operations) with proficiency equal to combat 
operations.”26 This shift also recognizes that the military cannot conduct long-term 
development without the involvement of NGOs and other state agencies. The clearest 
example of an attempt to integrate with other entities is the employment of Provisional 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. These teams are made up of 
military security and members from both the DoD and DoS, with leadership from one or 
the other. These teams are tasked with one-year rotations in the combat zone, where they 
represent the coalition and provide advice and support in the areas of governance, 
security, agriculture, business development, etc. These teams are also charged with 
incorporating NGO activities into a cohesive plan for delivering not just aid, but also 
services that build host nation capacity.27 Within a PRT, there are many advisors and 
coordinators (rule of law, diplomacy, agriculture, engineering, governance, and civil 
affairs), with each of these advisors and coordinators responsible for everything that 
occurs within the province.28 This forces NGOs (in theory, and the majority of the time in 
actuality) to coordinate with the military in order to provide awareness of movement, 
security, and a cohesive and comprehensive development strategy. An example of this 
would be an NGO that has subject matter expertise in agriculture; it would have to 
integrate with the agriculture advisor, which would allow coordination between military 
and non-military actors so as to make sure that military actions were not detrimental to 
future development and long-lasting relationships between the NGO and the local 
population. 
                                                 
25U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency, (December 2006)  and US Army, Field Manual 
3-07 Stability Operations (October 2008). 
26U.S. DoD Instruction 3000.05. (Washington, DC, September 16, 2009). 
27U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations, (October 2008). 
28Aaron Park, “US Navy Seabees as a Stability Asset” (M.A.Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
September 2009), 27–29. 
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3. Benefits of Cooperation 
Some NGOs, such as Doctors Without Borders and the Red Cross, argue that 
integration with the military is not advantageous to their mission, as they feel it detracts 
from their ability to allow the local populace to relate to them. They also believe that the 
military’s non-neutrality will prevent them from delivering aid and humanitarian support. 
Despite these arguments, the benefits of integration are undeniable. Both NGOs and the 
military have unique capabilities and neither can assist the host nation alone better than 
they can together. 
Despite high levels of competence and financing, NGOs cannot bring to their 
humanitarian efforts resources such as aircraft carriers, heavy airlift capabilities, medical 
ships, and other high value assets that the military possesses. They cannot provide for 
security in the same manner that the military can. The military brings these tools to the 
relief effort and can also augment the NGO with personnel if required (this is most 
common in disaster relief missions, rather than development missions) in order to more 
effectively deliver aid and services. 
Similarly, the military, with all of its high value assets and large budget 
appropriation, cannot effectively distribute aid (material and services) without the 
assistance of NGOs. NGOs can provide local interpreters, knowledge of the geopolitical 
situation, and an understanding of the damage resulting from a disaster; they can also 
establish networks to distribute aid. The NGOs bring subject matter expertise to the 
situation that the military does not possess. The military is composed of individuals that 
specialize in warfare and do not have an extensive amount of experience in the delivery 
of humanitarian aid. 
4. Existing Criticism of Military–NGO Cooperation 
a. Criticism Against Increased Military and NGO Cooperation 
There is limited academic and operational literature that discourages 
military–NGO cooperation. By and large, both fields have taken the position that, 
 20
through coordination, more can be accomplished. There are still those who support the 
traditional argument of required separation; however, these arguments are supported only 
by some NGOs and news organizations. These NGOs (for example, Doctors Without 
Borders and the International Council of the Red Cross) argue that establishing a separate 
humanitarian space is the only way that their survival in the combat zone can be 
guaranteed. They take the position that mere affiliation with the military threatens their 
claim to represent neutrality, impartiality, and humanity.29 There has been a rise in 
violence towards humanitarian workers, and some news organizations have attributed this 
to the increased cooperation between the more cooperative NGOs and the military.30 
Another argument that is commonly cited in support of the separation of 
military and NGO action is the belief that the mindsets of these two organizations are too 
different to produce worthwhile conversations. Referring back to the above description of 
these differing mindsets, the fundamental beliefs of some NGOs (i.e., not accepting 
justification of force, and the use of coercion), cause military–NGO conversations to 
devote so much time and effort on resolving these fundamental differences that common 
ground can never be met.31 
The final argument against military–NGO cooperation is the military’s 
need to maintain secrecy and information classification.32 According to this viewpoint, 
the military’s mission means that its involvement in kinetic warfare will continue. It will 
be tasked with operations that do not support NGO objectives (high-value personnel 
kidnappings, assassinations, crowd control through force) and because of this, 
information on current tasking and intent cannot always be shared. This perspective 
argues that full and open communication will never be a complete reality, and therefore 
trust cannot be long lasting. Unfortunately, without a high level of trust, there is no future 
in increased coordination. 
                                                 
29Daniel Byman, “Uncertain Partners: NGOs and the Military,” Survival, Vol. 43, No. 2, (Summer 
2001), 104. 
30Christianity Today. and Dufka. 
31Donna Winslow, “Strange Bedfellows: NGOs and the Military in Humanitarian Crisis,” The 
International Journal Of Peace Studies, Vol. 7, No 2, (Autumn–Winter 2002), section 9. 
32Byman, “Uncertain Partners,” 105. 
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b. Criticism for Increased Military and NGO Cooperation 
The arguments cited in the previous section are overshadowed by calls for 
increased coordination in both the academic and operational fields. The benefits of 
integration are undeniable. Both NGOs and the military have unique capabilities and 
neither one can assist the host nation alone better than they can together. 
A 2000 RAND Report was conducted with the goal of investigating the 
state of military–NGO cooperation and making recommendations for improvements. The 
report lists the advantages of integration as more rapid responses, smoother airlifts, more 
timely identification of needs, better exploitation of expertise, and more efficient use of 
resources.33 To explain further, despite the high level of competence and financing, 
NGOs cannot bring to the humanitarian efforts things like aircraft carriers, heavy airlift 
capabilities, medical ships, and other high value assets that the military possesses. They 
cannot provide for security in the same manner that the military can. The military brings 
these tools to the effort and augments the NGO with personnel if required (most common 
in disaster relief vice development missions) in order to more effectively deliver aid and 
services. 
Similarly, the military, with all of its high value assets and large budget 
appropriation, cannot effectively distribute aid (material and services) without the 
assistance of NGOs. NGOs can provide local interpreters, knowledge of the political 
situation, an understanding of the damage resulting from a disaster, and a network to 
distribute aid. The NGOs bring subject matter expertise to the situation that the military 
does not possess. The military is composed of individuals that specialize in warfare and 
do not have an extensive amount of experience in delivery of humanitarian aid. 
Kenneth Ballen presents the argument that the U.S. military’s being 
involved in humanitarian missions has far-reaching side effects. He claims that the U.S. 
military is modifying its global image and that this shift reduces the military’s current 
 
                                                 
33RAND Corporation, Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief 
Agencies and Allies in Humanitarians Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2000), 73–79. 
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reputation of being threatening or occupational-focused. He further argues that this in 
turn has the effect of delegitimizing anti-U.S. terrorist organizations and increasing 
national security through threat reduction.34 
5. Summary of the Current State of Military–NGO Cooperation 
The military and NGOs have had a long-standing difference of opinion regarding 
roles and responsibilities, as well as tactics and techniques for assisting a host nation in 
returning to a stable environment. During recent conflicts, the military mindset has 
approached a recognition that combat power is not the key to national security (as seen in 
DoDINST 3000.05 and the Army Field Manuals), but rather that the development of 
lesser developed countries in order to provide them the capacity to control possible 
asymmetric threats is. Only through combining the efforts of NGOs and the military can 
each’s assets be maximized and the local population be properly served.  
F. EXISTING EFFORTS TO IMPROVE COOPERATION 
With recognition of the importance of military–NGO relations, the military has 
begun spending time and efforts on training military officers for reconstruction 
operations in post-conflict environments. The following subsections discuss existing 
efforts. 
1. Workshops and Conferences 
One method of attempting to increase military officer competence is by providing 
workshops and conferences that discuss the various topics in a formal setting and that 
include both military and NGO participants. Some of these conferences focus on the topic 
of military–NGO cooperation, while others might have lectures and small group 
discussions that focus on a different topic, facilitating improved communication between 
the two communities in order to promote understanding and increased future cooperation. 
                                                 
34Kenneth Ballen, “Humanitarian aid: winning the terror war; Peaceful military missions are curbing 
anti-U.S. feelings in the Muslim world,” The Christian Science Monitor, (December 20, 2006), 9. 
 23
One example of education that is already taking place is the Joint Humanitarian 
Operations Course, hosted by USAID. This is a two-day forum that exposes military 
officers to not only the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), but also 
their perspective on different NGOs.35   
The Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction 
Studies (CSRS) hosts four-day workshops that gather military members, NGO personnel, 
and other governmental employees to attend lectures and work together to focus on topics 
such as agricultural, security sector reform, and military–NGO relations.36 
2. Exercises 
There are many cooperative partnership exercises that the military hosts that 
allow for NGO integration in non-conflict environments. These exercises include, but are 
not limited to, African Partnership, Pacific Partnership, and UNITAS. While some NGOs 
have already been incorporated, opportunities remain for increasing the level of 
involvement and interaction. These exercises typically consist of a Navy ship visiting 
underdeveloped countries and participating in humanitarian efforts.  
As stated in Section D., most reporting on these exercises is found in public 
relations reports and generally provides highlights of accomplishments to include “feel-
good” photographs. While this delivers initial feedback, some reports have stated that 
long-term effects of these exercises are not as beneficial as initially suspected. For 
example, Medical Civil Action Programs (MEDCAP) and Dental Civil Action Programs 
(DENCAP) provide aid that is not typically available to the local population which given 
in a single delivery method might undermine the legitimacy of the local government. 
 While this argument exists, the purpose of this thesis is to explore the 
effectiveness of activities that increase military–NGO cooperation, not debate the 
difference in short term aid and long term development. 
                                                 
35Joint Humanitarian Operations Course hosted by USAID OFDA, (Monterey, CA, September 21–22, 
2010). 
36“Working in the Same Space” Conference, hosted by Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction 
Studies, Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, CA, September 21–24, 2008). 
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3. Briefings and Publications 
Many organizations are now producing publications for military officers that 
either provide as much information as possible or pamphlets that contain easy-to-read 
summaries of military–NGO relations. In addition to these publications, most officers 
entering into a post-conflict environment receive command or individual situation 
briefings that present them with information regarding which type of NGOs are operating 
in the area they are reporting to, and the scope of the NGOs’ operations. These briefings 
and publications always try to provide balanced information, where it is not so much as to 
become cumbersome, but detailed enough that the information has sufficient facts to 
serve as more than just summaries. This balance is difficult to achieve and in some cases, 
publications remain unread because of either an overwhelming amount of information or 
information that is too telegraphic to be useful. 
One example of published material that strikes the balance effectively is the 
Guide to Nongovernment Organizations for the Military by Frandsen and Lawry. It 
provides a good introductory conversational summary of the standard practices, 
capabilities, and mentalities of NGOs, in addition to providing a more detailed 
information appendix that can be used as reference material if required.37 
4. Education 
The military currently has educational programs that allow officers to attend 
public and private universities to receive advanced degrees. Some of these programs 
focus on technical education such as the science and engineering fields, while other 
programs focus on degrees in the social sciences. The military has been traditionally 
more focused on technical degrees; however, with the recent increase in post-conflict 
reconstruction operations, it has been recognized that advanced degrees in the social 
sciences may be more applicable in those environments than technical ones. 
                                                 
37Frandsen, Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military. 
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G. POTENTIAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Sabbatical Program/Internships 
The military has recently started offering a sabbatical program where members 
can go into a leave-without-pay status in order to pursue personal goals for up to three 
years.38 This program, or something similar, could be leveraged or created in order to 
have officers spend time embedded within NGOs in order to gain understanding of the 
NGO perspective and the humanitarian aid, post-conflict, development environment, thus 
being able to better apply military assets in that environment. 
The existing sabbatical program offers only health benefits while in the leave-
without-pay status.  This would require an NGO to hire or stipend the military member 
while on sabbatical. This might be unappealing to NGOs, but the creation of an internship 
program by the military could feasibly pay the member’s salary and allow the member to 
work with the NGO at no cost to the NGO itself. Revisiting the issues of neutrality, 
impartiality, and humanity, it is understood that some NGOs would feel that having a 
member on the military payroll would endanger their “humanitarian space.” However, 
looking at this possibility optimistically, it should be attempted, as the benefits of having 
a military member who has completed the internship program with the corresponding 
experiences, knowledge, and personal relationships, would increase the effectiveness of 
the military in that environment and the overall effectiveness of the aid and development 
community. 
2. Military Officer Designation 
Another challenge that the military faces is the current method of promoting and 
developing its officers. Officers are assigned to a specific warfare community (surface 
ships, submarines, aviation, etc.) and there is no community that focuses exclusively on 
military–NGO coordination. This results in officers not receiving additional training or 
development in this area. Most officers that become involved in the post-conflict 
                                                 
38Rick Maze, “DoD plan would allow sabbaticals up to 3 years.” Navy Times (April 2, 2008).  
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environment are only engaged in it for one tour before they are forced to rotate into 
another tour. Military officers have traditionally been discouraged from remaining 
outside of their community for too long, because this results in a decrease in name 
recognition and expertise in that community. This in turn typically results in reduced 
chances of promotion. 
This pattern is seen at both the operational level and the strategic level.  Most 
humanitarian mission involvement at the strategic level does not occur until officers are 
at the staff officer level (typically, O5-O6). Furthermore, the majority of the staff officers 
that are involved in these missions come from a warfare community. Navy Surface 
Warfare and Aviators or Army Infantry and Artillery Officers are frequently thrown into 
reconstruction operations, despite the fact that they have previously received little 
training in reconstruction operations; they are then expected to operate at a high level of 
decision-making.  
Situations of this sort could be remedied by introducing junior officers into the aid 
and development environment and by establishing a designator or pipeline for continued 
development that will allow them to hone their skills, develop NGO relationships, and 
become experts in conflict and post-conflict development in order to create a group of 
senior officers that have a background in reconstruction operations. 
H. RECOMMENDATIONS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THIS RESEARCH 
The focus of this thesis is on efforts to develop military officers and the previous 
sections have stayed within that scope. This section, however, discusses 
recommendations that have been made for improving military–NGO relations, but which 
do not fall into the realm of officer development. This information is presented in order to 
provide background information on the other published recommendations and other 
research efforts. 
1. Published Recommendations  
Thomas Sexton presents an analysis of benefits of a DoD-run coordination cell, a 
DoS/USAID lead cell, and a hybrid coordination cell in order to increase efficiency in 
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humanitarian aid operations. In his conclusion, he claims that none of those options 
would be as beneficial as simply letting NGOs run the reconstruction efforts.39 There are 
articles that support Sexton’s claim that the military merely gets in the way and that 
because it is a large organization that has so many rules and regulations, and such a large 
tooth-to-tail ratio, it should merely play a supporting role and not try to take the lead in 
any humanitarian action.40 
While Sexton argues for a “military backseat role” in reconstruction, John M. 
George offers recommendations on how to integrate these efforts. He proposes that 
civilian control should be first strengthened, and that civilians should then become more 
educated about military assets. He recommends increasing the prestige associated with 
working in humanitarian efforts rather than combat operations; this can be done through 
promotion opportunities and exercise funding.41 
Daniel Byman proposes having the military establish crisis response centers at the 
Combatant Command (COCOM) level in order to effectively manage resources. He also 
recommends strengthening the non-military departments within the government and 
encouraging them to lead in efforts at coordination with NGOs.42 
Scott Feil draws the conclusion that five areas need improvement: unity of effort; 
integrated security forces; DDR (demobilization, demilitarization, and reintegration); 
regional security and reconstruction of security institutions; and information and 
intelligence.43 Most applicable to this research project is the unity of security area, where 
he specifically recommends increasing the COCOM staff to include liaisons with other 
departments and non-state actors, increasing assessment capability by creating teams that 
can properly estimate the on-the-ground situation, reviewing DoD and DoS office 
                                                 
39Thomas Sexton, DoD Take a Knee. Let the NGOs Continue to Lead (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. 
Army War College, March 2008), 9–25. 
40R.G. Edmonson, “Learning from Disaster,” Journal of Commerce, (February 15, 2010). 
41John M. George, “The Politics of Peace: The Challenge of Civil-Military Cooperation in Somalia,” 
in Public Administration and Management, Vol. 10, No. 2, (2005), 180–182. 
42Byman, “Uncertain Partners,” 109. 
43Scott Feil, “Building Better Foundations: Security in Post-conflict Reconstruction,” Washington 
Quarterly (Autumn 2002), 102. 
 28
structure, realigning to improve coordination through alignment, and increasing and 
improving military training for the post-conflict environment.44 
Nancy Roberts brings a public administrator perspective to the conversation by 
recommending that research be conducted on the information processes, as categorized 
by the type of environment that the military and NGOs are operating in.45 While this 
research would focus on the post-conflict reconstruction environment, she makes the 
point that what works in one type of experience or exercise (e.g., disaster relief, 
peacekeeping) might not work in the post-conflict environment, as the organizations have 
different approaches to each environment and information will be shared differently. In 
addition, she recommends research that differentiates between small-scale and large-scale 
NGOs when interacting with the military and operating independently. 
2. Other Research Efforts 
The military is emphasizing the design of software that is similar to social media, 
in that it allows information to be geo-located and shared. This allows cooperation and 
coordination to take place in delivering aid and assistance. Currently, the best-known 
software program of this type is the one developed by Usahidi. Usahidi is an NGO that 
provides an information-sharing forum that is commonly accessed by other NGOs in 
crisis and post-conflict areas.46 The military has recognized its popularity and has 
decided to try to advance this technology in order to develop a resource allocation 
medium and thereby foster greater coordination. Two programs that are currently under 
development are Star Tides47 and Quicknets.48 While these programs show the ability to 
increase cooperation, they are outside of the scope of this research project. 
 
                                                 
44Ibid., 102–103. 
45Nancy C. Roberts, “Spanning ‘Bleeding’ Boundaries: Humanitarianism, NGOs, and the Civilian-
Military Nexus in the Post-Cold War Era,” Public Administration Review (March/April 2010), 220. 
46http://www.ushahidi.com/, accessed on August 12, 2011. 
47http://star-tides.net/, accessed on August 12, 2011. 
48http://www.quick-nets.org/, accessed on August 12, 2011. 
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III. DEVELOPMENT AND RELEASE OF THE SURVEY 
This chapter will discuss the effort that was put into developing and releasing the 
survey, in order to provide insight into the survey-creation process and the information 
that each question was designed to solicit from the respondent.  
A. SURVEY DEVELOPMENT SOFTWARE 
In accordance with Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Human Research 
Protection Program Policy on the Use of Online Survey Data Collection Tools49 and the 
direction of the NPS Institutional Review Board for Protection of Human Subject’s (IRB) 
guidance, the online tool Survey Monkey (www.surveymonkey.com) was used. Survey 
Monkey is online software that allows surveys to be developed and that creates a unique 
hyperlink that can be e-mailed to potential respondents inviting them to participate.  
B. GOALS FOR THE SURVEY 
The goal of the survey is to gauge the effectiveness of ongoing efforts and to 
explore the feasibility of potential improvements. This survey was designed to be 
presented to people with practical, relevant experience in order to anonymously extract 
opinions and perceptions, which would determine a baseline of what is working and 
would also identify possible opportunities for introducing better methods. The results of 
this survey are to become available to the academic field for future research and to 
military decision makers who can utilize this information to make decisions as to what 
sort of training and preparation should be available for military officers. 
C. ESTABLISHING A POOL OF PARTICIPANTS 
Invitation e-mails were sent to two groups of individuals. The first included 
individuals participating in NPS RELIEF (Research & Experimentation for Local & 
International Emergency & First Responders) and the second, members of the Center for 
                                                 
49Naval Postgraduate School Memorandum Ser. 41/126, January 31, 2011 
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Excellence in Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance Headquarters Office (COE) 
located in Honolulu, Hawaii. Both of these organizations were approached prior to their 
participants and members being invited to take the survey, in order to gain permission 
from a supervisory member to allow personnel under their responsibility to participate in 
this research. 
These organizations sometimes focus on the humanitarian relief aspect of 
military–NGO operations; however, the members of these organizations are also familiar 
with the post-conflict environment and the interaction of the two mentalities, which is 
applicable to this study. 
1. Naval Postgraduate School RELIEF Participants 
The Naval Postgraduate School hosts numerous conferences and workshops that 
address a wide spectrum of issues related to the military.  
RELIEF seeks to leverage technology to explore solutions to challenges 
created by natural and/or man-made disasters. We bring together 
corporations, non-profits, local, state, federal, and international 
government agencies in a field environment to get dirty, forge 
relationships, and find solutions together.50  
The RELIEF 11-4 conference took place at Camp Roberts, California, from 
August 3, 2011 to August 5, 2011, with 98 participants. 
2. Center for Excellence in Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance 
The COE is a DoD organization dedicated to international disaster 
preparedness and management capacity building for the purpose of 
decreasing the impact of human suffering. Established by Congress in 
1994 as a direct reporting unit to the PACOM, the COE now supports U.S. 
COCOMs throughout the world.51  
                                                 
50http://faculty.nps.edu/rrbuettn/index.html, accessed on July 28, 2011. 
51http://coe-dmha.org/AboutUs/Default.aspx,  accessed on July 28, 2011. 
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Through a personal contact, the COE was approached to participate in the survey 
in order to provide a military perspective of experience in the results of the survey. Seven 
people from this organization were invited to participate in the survey. 
3. Sample Size Analysis 
The entire military–NGO field is comprised of thousands of people from both the 
military and NGOs. Due to restrictions on human research, the unavailability of a 
coherent network or contact list, and the complications of trying to compile and analyze 
that amount of data, the scope of this thesis was narrowed to obtain a sampling of the 
field. This sampling cannot be considered inclusive enough to capture all of the opinions 
and perspectives of the entire field. This pool of participants was selected because, while 
it doesn’t include all of the personnel involved in the field, it can provide an accurate 
sampling that should be large enough to draw some basic conclusions on the themes of 
the survey participants’ opinions and perspectives. 
4. Institutional Review Board Authority 
All appropriate paperwork was submitted to the NPS IRB prior to inviting any 
human subject to participate in the research effort. The research project was granted 
permission to proceed on June 22, 2011 (initial application to release survey to COE) and 
July 8, 2011 (amendment to broaden survey to include RELIEF personnel). Approval was 
based on the research being anonymous and voluntary, that it did not propose collection 
of personal identifying information, and the determination that this research is considered 
minimal risk. 
D. CONSENT STATEMENT 
In accordance with IRB protocol, a voluntary consent form was presented as the 
first question and was a mandatory question (as annotated by asterisk preceding the 
question number). Through the Survey Monkey software, participants were incapable of 




Figure 1.   Consent Statement Screenshot 
E. MULTIPLE CHOICE SURVEY QUESTIONS 
The survey consisted of eight multiple-choice topical questions where participants 
were required to reply on a Likert Scale that normalized responses in the standard 
categories of “Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree, and Strongly Agree.”  
Questions also contained an “N/A” or Not Applicable choice. This was done in order to 
be able to categorize responses and sort the data into the charts that are presented in 
Chapter IV. 
Each question also had an open comment block where participants could provide 
additional input, such as expanding their response to include an explanation of their 
answer, expound on their perspective, or provide feedback on the question in terms of 
how it was framed and asked. 
The survey was limited to eight main questions in order to remain brief. This was 
done with intent of promoting participation and preventing those participants that started 
the survey from not finishing due to the time commitment. 
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1. Question 1 
 
Figure 2.   Question 1 Screenshot 
This question was developed to gauge the participants’ opinion of the military’s 
role in post-conflict coordination. It was written to discover if the respondents felt there 
were positive or negative impacts. According to academic literature, the involvement of 
the military is essential to establish security and has the added benefit of improving the 
delivery of supplies and personnel into hostile regions. This question was intended to 
confirm if the academic view is shared amongst field operatives and to provide validation 
that the first part of the hypothesis is widely accepted by the participants of the survey. 
2. Question 2 
 
Figure 3.   Question 2 Screenshot 
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This question was designed to extract the opinion towards military officers that 
are engaged in post-conflict operations. There are many ongoing preparation matters; 
however, the quality and delivery of that material is sometimes questionable. This 
question generated feedback on the end product: the military officer’s capabilities. It was 
also intended to validate the third portion of the hypothesis, namely, that military officers 
should be better prepared for the post-conflict environment. 
3. Question 3 
 
Figure 4.   Question 3 Screenshot 
Questions 3 through 8 are a series of questions that were designed to collect data 
that would narrow the focus of Question 2 by querying the respondent on each of the 
elements within Question 2.  
Question 3 investigates the effectiveness of workshops and seminars. This 
question was broken in two multiple-choice sub-questions in order to accurately grasp the 
effectiveness of collaborative workshops. The first sub-question was meant to solicit 
feedback on the quality of the workshops. The second sub-question was developed to see 
if there is a declining return on investment in terms of time; in other words, as the 
conference continues in length do participants and organizations continue to get similar 
benefits for expending their time and funds as they did at the beginning of the workshop. 
Typical workshops do not last longer than one work week: the JHOC is a two-day 
seminar, RELIEF 11-4 is a three-day workshop, and the CSRS seminars are four days in 
length. Through personal observation, the workshops operate in a similar manner to a 
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traditional learning curve, where the incremental change in knowledge is larger during 
the introduction of material, but tapers off as the workshop continues. 
The responses to this question were carefully reviewed, as the RELIEF participant 
pool was preparing to take part in a workshop and the COE provides workshops and 
conferences. Responses could thus have been an attempt to influence the availability of 
funding through self-justification. 
4. Question 4 
 
Figure 5.   Question 4 Screenshot 
The purpose of this question was to receive feedback in terms of the usefulness of 
the exercises that are routinely conducted. 
5. Question 5 
 
Figure 6.   Question 5 Screenshot 
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This question was developed to receive feedback on the completeness, 
effectiveness, and availability of the materials presented to the military officers who are 
preparing to engage in post-conflict operations. 
6. Question 6 
 
Figure 7.   Question 6 Screenshot 
This question was developed to gain an understanding of the perception of 
military officers of advanced degrees and to gauge the worthiness of increased spending 
on military officer education. As with previous questions, this question was designed 
provide feedback on potential return on investment of funds. 
7. Question 7 
 
Figure 8.   Question 7 Screenshot 
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This question was developed with two sub-questions in an effort to gauge the 
existing perception of room for potential increases in military–NGO coordination. While 
academic literature supports the argument that the differences in mindset can be 
overcome, and must be overcome to operate more effectively, this question was intended 
reveal the opinions of field operatives. 
This question also introduced the concept of having military officers conduct 
embedded training with an NGO to increase the officer’s understanding of the NGO 
environment, organization, and perspective. This question was also intended to provide 
insight into the openness of NGOs in allowing a military member to be incorporated into 
their workforce. 
8. Question 8 
 
Figure 9.   Question 8 Sceenshot 
Traditionally, military officers are not afforded the opportunity to focus on the 
area of post-conflict operations; they are encouraged to remain within their specific skill 
set (aviation, surface warfare, etc.) and even if an officer has the ability to take advantage 
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of a post-conflict operations experience, rarely is he or she allowed to remain in that 
arena. If the responses indicate that quality of an officer is not optimal, due to lack of 
proper development, then this would provide insight into possible changes in the 
promotion system or manpower organization. 
F. OPEN COMMENT QUESTIONS 
 
Figure 10.   Open Comment Questions Screenshot 
These final question blocks were provided in order to offer participants an 
opportunity to be contacted to share amplifying information and to recommend someone 
else to be surveyed. While each question had an individual comment box, the purpose of 
this field was to request to be contacted to provide additional input to the survey or to be 
provided the results of the survey. 
It was the intent of the research team to provide a summary of results to those 
individuals interested in receiving information; in addition, a briefing was provided at 
RELIEF 11-4 on August 5, 2011 that presented the initial results. Responses to this 
section were omitted from the publication of this thesis in order to prevent e-mail address 
information from being made public. 
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G.  RELEASE OF THE SURVEY 
Upon receiving approval of the survey and approval of the participant list, an e-
mail was distributed on July 13, 2011, stating that the survey was available for 
participation. The RELIEF 11-4 facilitators maintained the e-mail list of participants and 
distributed the invitation e-mail. The survey remained available for review and 
completion until August 16, 2011. The survey remained open for a total of 34 days, 
which was estimated to be the appropriate amount of time to capture people prior to 
participating in the RELIEF 11-4 workshop, during the workshop, and those that were 
recommended by the original survey participants. The timeframe of four weeks was 
estimated to be suitable, because if a potential participant was on vacation or travelled 
during a portion of this time he or she would still have the opportunity to participate. 
The e-mail invitation to participate was distributed from the research team 
directly to the participants from COE and to RELIEF participants via the workshop 
facilitators. 
 
Figure 11.   Invitation E-mail Screenshot 
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H. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA 
This survey collected no demographic data in order to provide the respondents 
with the confidence that results would be completely anonymous. This prevented results 
from being analyzed through grouping respondents by career field; however, this was 
done in effort to receive more truthful answers, as participants would not be concerned 
that any answer could result in retribution. 
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IV. SURVEY RESULTS  
A. SUMMARY OF PARTICIPATION 
Of those who were invited to participate, 52 people opened the link to the survey; 
of that number, 27 completed the survey in its entirety. This is a 52% completion rate 
among those that attempted the survey. From the overall invitation listing (7 COE and 98 
RELIEF, totaling 105), this resulted in 25% participation. This percentage appears 
appropriate, as not all people participating in the RELIEF Conference have applicable 
experience in the military–NGO relations field. The number of responses appears to be an 
adequate sampling of people with applicable experience, who can respond to the survey 
and provide results that can be analyzed. 
B. DETAILED RESULTS BY QUESTION 
In reviewing the responses and extracting information in order to make 
comprehensive statements, the data was filtered by first removing the “Not Applicable” 
responses and then by placing the responses in a pie chart. The charts display the answers 
separated by the Likert Scale in the first chart and then grouped by positive (“Strongly 
Agree” and “Agree”) and negative (“Strongly Disagree” and “Disagree”) responses for 
second chart. This was done in order to graphically depict the data, which assists in the 
interpretation of the responses. No in-depth statistical methods were used in the data 
analysis, as the purpose of this study was to find general impressions and perceptions. 
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1. Question 1 
a. Response Data 
 
Figure 12.   Question 1 Results Screenshot 
b. Charts 
   
Figure 13.   Question 1 Charts 
c. Analysis 
One-third of the respondents selected “Strongly Agree” and over half 
answered in the affirmative that military involvement is required in post-conflict 
operations. Just over 25% of respondents replied in the negative. These responses show 
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that there is general, although not overwhelming, concurrence with the academic 
literature and the first part of this thesis’ hypothesis. 
The majority of open-ended responses proposed that the answer should not 
necessarily be a “yes” or “no,” but rather that it should be situation-driven based on the 
security situation, the terrain, the needs of the humanitarian or reconstruction effort, and 
culture of the population receiving the help. Most respondents did recognize that there are 
situations where military involvement should be provided and is necessary. 
2. Question 2 
a. Response Data 
 
Figure 14.   Question 2 Results Screenshot 
b. Charts 
    
Figure 15.   Question 2 Charts 
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c. Analysis 
The responses received confirm that there is skepticism regarding the 
preparedness of military officers who find themselves in military–NGO operations and 
that existing methods of preparing military officers for these operations are not as 
effective as they could be; less than 25% of respondents felt that officers were properly 
prepared. This confirms the third part of the hypothesis, namely, that military officers are 
not properly prepared for the situations they are placed in. 
3. Question 3 
a. Response Data 
 
Figure 16.   Question 3 Results Screenshot 
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b. Charts 
    
      
Figure 17.   Question 3 Charts 
c. Analysis 
The responses to the first sub-question indicate that workshops are 
generally well received; however, the large portion of neutral responses, nearly 40%, as 
well as less than 50% of positive replies, indicates that there is either a level of apathy 
toward or a strong variance in the quality of workshops. The open-ended responses 
highlighted that NGOs find it difficult to participate due to time and funding constraints 
and as a result these workshops are predominantly attended by the military and other 
government organizations. The scenario described does not benefit military–NGO 
coordination to the level that the workshops advertise. These responses were unexpected, 
as the people participating in the survey either were attending a workshop or are 
responsible for hosting one. 
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The responses to the second sub-question contained no “Strongly Agree” 
or “Strongly Disagree”; with nearly half of the replies being neutral it appears that the 
timeframe of the workshops is about right. 
4. Question 4 
a. Response Data 
 
Figure 18.   Question 4 Results Screenshot 
b. Charts 
    
Figure 19.   Question 4 Charts 
c. Analysis 
In response to Question 4, there were more “Strongly Agree” replies for 
this question than any other. This combined with only one “Strongly Disagree” and an 
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overwhelming 75% positive response indicates a high level of support for these types of 
exercises. Further, these responses indicate that by military and NGO personnel working 
together, they gain a better understanding of each other’s organization and mindset, 
which allows development of the military officer. 
5. Question 5 
a. Response Data 
 
Figure 20.   Question 5 Results Screenshot 
b. Charts 
       
Figure 21.   Question 5 Charts 
c. Analysis 
The majority of the replies to this question was “Neutral” and contained 
no “Strongly Agree” or “Strongly Disagree” responses. This can be interpreted as a lack 
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of strong emotions towards written publications and a lack of support for continued 
development of publications compared to other methods of developing military officers. 
However, this question had the lowest number of positive responses than any other 
recommendation. An open-ended comment is quick to point out “…no pamphlet replaces 
experience and face-to-face interaction.” Another challenge of written publications 
appears to be that there is such a vast and varied collection of publications that officers 
are overwhelmed by trying to find what is relevant material and what is not. 
6. Question 6 
a. Response Data 
 
Figure 22.   Question 6 Results Screenshot 
b. Charts 
    
Figure 23.   Question 6 Charts 
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c. Analysis 
This question received the strongest positive response compared to all 
other questions. In addition to having such an overwhelming positive response, this was 
the only question that had only one negative response. It should be deduced here that the 
participants value education highly and that they feel the right kind of education has the 
ability to shift the military officer’s mindset towards cooperation, more than any of the 
other proposed recommendations. The open-ended responses clearly indicated that the 
military needs to be less technically minded and more inclined toward social science 
because opinion is that future conflicts will involve social problems. 
7. Question 7 
a. Response Data 
 
Figure 24.   Question 7 Results Screenshot 
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b. Charts 
       
    
Figure 25.   Question 7 Charts 
c. Analysis 
The first sub-question solicited a negative majority response of nearly 
75%, which underscores that participants feel strongly that there is room for 
improvement in this area and that improvements can in fact be made. 
The second sub-question introduced the concept of embedding an officer 
within an NGO when that officer was taking part in a sabbatical from his or her 
traditional occupation. This concept was well received, with a nearly 50% positive 
response and only 25% feeling this was a bad concept. Open-ended comments provide 
further insight through statements that embedding military offices on sabbatical could be 
considered overly ambitious; however, the establishment of a position for a permanent 
duty direct liaison, or for a well-developed subject matter expert who would be 
responsible for coordination with specific NGOs, could be more achievable goal. 
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8. Question 8 
a. Response Data 
 
Figure 26.   Question 8 Results Screenshot 
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b. Charts 
       
       
    
Figure 27.   Question 8 Charts 
c. Analysis 
This question received more “Not Applicable” responses than any other 
question in the survey set. This is understandable, as the military promotion system is 
unfamiliar to those that do not have regular dealings with the system, such as non-
military personnel. In addition to a high number of “Not Applicable” responses, there 
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was also a high percentage of “Neutral” replies. Overall, the responses to these three sub-
questions were fairly balanced between positive and negative, with the participants 
showing minor interest in changing the promotion system compared to other 
recommendations. 
C. OPEN COMMENT QUESTIONS 
The open comment questions provided a listing of participants that were 
interested in receiving feedback from this survey. They were provided, via e-mail, the 
charts that are included in this thesis and directions on how to access the Defense 
Technical Information Center website in order to allow them to review this thesis upon its 
publication. 
Two additional e-mail addresses were also provided for people who were 
recommended to participate in the survey. The invitation to participate e-mail was sent to 
both of them. Due to anonymity, it is impossible to confirm their participation. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
In summary, the results of this survey supported the hypotheses that were 
previously presented: military involvement is required in the post-conflict environment; 
there is a notable amount of room for improvement in the area of military-NGO 
cooperation and coordination; and by properly preparing military officers to operate in 
this environment, there will be improved cooperation and coordination between the 
military and NGOs. 
The first survey question established that the military’s involvement is required in 
post-conflict efforts, with a 58% concurrence, and only 27% responding negatively. The 
remaining questions were useful in determining validation of the remaining parts of the 
hypothesis by indicating that if military officers received better training and better 
understood the NGO organization and mindset, they would be more open-minded about 
participating in cooperation efforts, which would then lead to better cooperation and 
coordination in the future. 
1. Themes That Were Identified 
When reviewed holistically, these responses can provide some easily recognizable 
themes. First, confirming the hypothesis, it is recognized that there is support for military 
involvement in the post-conflict environment, that there is a need for improvement in 
military–NGO cooperation and coordination, and that improvements can be made by 
better preparing military officers. Second, there is support for efforts to develop military 
officers focused on interaction with people outside of the military through continued 
education or exercises rather than through literature or briefings. Third, opportunities to 
cooperate and coordinate in controlled scenarios will lead to more effective cooperation 
and coordination in challenging real-world scenarios. 
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2. Recommendations Toward Improving Military–NGO Relations 
The final seven multiple choice questions contained opportunities for the 
participants to comment on existing military officer training efforts and potential 
recommendations for the future. This was done to provide information regarding the 
expected effectiveness of methods so as to allow continued focus on those methods that 
are effective, to discontinue or improve methods not considered as effective, or 
implement new methods that received support. The respondents provided data that 
indicates the preferred way of improving military officer preparedness is by providing 
advanced social science education, followed closely by participation in exercises where 
military and NGO personnel interact, as seen in the high positive response percentages 
for these options. The concepts of sabbaticals, workshops, and altering the promotion 
system received positive responses and support; however, none of these topics stood out 
with overwhelming support in terms of positive response percentages. Workshops, 
conferences, and the sabbatical concept scored higher than promotion system adjustments 
due to fewer negative responses. The provision of briefings, publications, and pamphlets 
received the lowest amount of support with less than 20% of the participants stating that 
this method has been effective. 
 




6 Social Science Degree 82% 4.04 
4 Cooperative Exercises 75% 4.07 
7.2 Embedded with NGO on Sabbatical 46% 3.29 
3.1 Workshops and Conferences 44% 3.30 
8.2 Adjust the Promotion System 35% 3.13 
5 Briefings and Publications 18% 2.91 
Table 1.   Recommendation Analysis 
 57
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research provided valuable data in the field of military–NGO relations; 
however, the interpretation of the data, as carried out by this thesis’s examination of 
survey results, merely represents a starting point for future research. 
The data reviewed represents the opinions and perceptions of only a fraction of 
the people involved in military–NGO cooperation efforts. Due to constraints on time, 
human research protocols, and the lack of an existing network this survey was only 
available to a limited number of the relevant population. Future research should attempt 
to broaden the participant base. This broadening should be in not just the number of 
people surveyed, but also the number and types of organizations, with an eye toward 
capturing all relevant perspectives. This would allow more all-encompassing data that 
could be reviewed for themes in order to make recommendations. 
In addition to expanding the participant pool, it is also recommended that future 
surveys include demographic information questions. This would allow for more in-depth 
analyses of which organizations support certain recommendations. 
This thesis focused on the development of the military officer; however, there are 
numerous ongoing efforts towards improving the state of the relationship between the 
military and NGOs. One recommendation is to realign military organizations so that they 
are more easily understood by NGOs, which would provide NGO personnel a method of 
entering the military decision-making system. There is a contingent of people that feels 
that information-sharing through technology will lead to greater cooperation and 
coordination. This group feels that resource leveling and volunteerism tasking can occur 
through software and remove personalities from the equation, which will allow delivery 
of humanitarian aid to whoever is identified from any organization, regardless of 
affiliation. The improvement effort should also consider how to educate and increase the 
NGO personnel’s understanding of the military. Future research should broaden 
recommendations for improving military–NGO relations by allowing respondents to 
provide feedback on these methods in addition to officer development recommendations. 
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Future research should implement more advanced statistical data processing to 
better analyze the results in order to provide better insight into the respondents’ answers. 
This will allow for identification and removal of potential spoilers to the survey, as well 
as providing a better understanding of the strength of the respondents’ answers. 
While not necessary for future survey deployment, survey release can be 
conducted during a specific conference. This would allow a streamlined IRB package, as 
the organization responsible for hosting the conference has the authority to give all 
participants permission to be involved. In addition, having the participants, computers, 
and response time built into the conference schedule, it can be assumed that the survey 
completion percentage would increase, as the target audience would not be distracted 
during the release of a survey, as is often the case when people are not collocated. 
C. CLOSING STATEMENT 
In closing, the research conducted in this thesis confirms the hypothesis that was 
originally stated: the military’s involvement is required in the reconstruction effort in the 
post-conflict environment due to security concerns, funding and resource availability, and 
involvement leading to the transition from a conflict to post-conflict situation; there are 
inefficiencies in military–NGO cooperation and coordination due to differences in 
mindsets or a general lack of understanding, and that this area has room for improvement 
that will allow better cooperation and coordination in the future; and that by better 
preparing military officers assigned to post-conflict reconstruction through education, 
exercises, and other opportunities for interaction, cooperation and coordination can be 
improved. 
This thesis provides the academic field with a baseline of data that can be carried 
forward through other research.  In addition, it provides military decision-makers 
information that can used to better prepare military officers for post-conflict 
reconstruction operations. 
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APPENDIX.  SURVEY RESULTS SCREENSHOTS 
A. DESCRIPTION OF SURVEY RESULTS SCREENSHOTS 
The following 15 pages contain screen shots of the of the survey results as 
provided by www.surveymonkey.com.  This information was then reviewed and the data 
inserted into graphs to provide clarity when reviewing.  These graphs can be found in 
Chapter IV.  Also included in this appendix are the comments provided by the 
respondents.  Comments of note or if there was a significant theme found in the 
responses, this observation was stated in Chapter IV.  The comments are listed in their 
entirety in order to provide a comprehensive report for future researchers.  The second 
half of Page 15 and all of Page 16 have been removed in order to protect e-mail addresses 
of individuals that requested to receive feedback on this research. 
This thesis organized the multiple choice questions as one through eight because 
that is how it appeared to those taking the survey; however, the screenshots of the survey 
result include the consent statement as Question 1 and each following question to be 
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